This study evaluates the order of magnitude of the monetary cost of achieving an international strategic terror weapons (TWP) limitation agreement in an asymmetric arms race, with an application to the Israeli-Syrian conflict. It extends the Kagan, Tishler and Weiss (2005) framework and develops a model of resource allocation between consumption and security goods in a non-cooperative (Cournot) arms race between a developed country and a less developed country. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries engaged in the arms race, and to evaluate the applicability of international and dyad strategic TWP limitation agreements. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use. The results show that if considered from a purely monetary perspective, such an agreement is within reach.
This study evaluates the order of magnitude of the monetary cost of achieving an international strategic terror weapons (TWP) limitation agreement in an asymmetric arms race, with an application to the Israeli-Syrian conflict. It extends the Kagan, Tishler and Weiss (2005) framework and develops a model of resource allocation between consumption and security goods in a non-cooperative (Cournot) arms race between a developed country and a less developed country. The model is used to predict the optimal mix of weapons of the two countries engaged in the arms race, and to evaluate the applicability of international and dyad strategic TWP limitation agreements. Applying the model to the arms race between Israel and Syria demonstrates its use. The results show that if considered from a purely monetary perspective, such an agreement is within reach.
